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Taxes, transfers and spending
in Spain: the regions and the
centre seek the right balance
Spain is in the process of
decentralizing its fiscal system to give
more power and responsibility to the
Autonomous Communities. (*) 
In July 2001 the central government
and the Communities of Spain agreed
to expand and broaden the scope of
what the Spanish call “ceded taxes.”
This was the second phase in a reform
that started in 1996. 
The main objective of that original
reform was to make the Communities
as responsible for the money they
raised as they already were for the
money they spent — thus decreasing
what in fiscal federalism literature is
known as “vertical fiscal imbalance.”
(This occurs when the revenues of one
order of government do not correspond
to its expenditure responsibilities.
Frequently this imbalance takes the
form of central government revenues
exceeding its legislative and executive
responsibilities while the constituent
units’ revenues are inadequate for their
responsibilities.) 
Until the 1996 reform, ceded taxes had
been taxes levied by the central
government whose yield was “ceded”
or granted to Communities according
to the amount raised in each
community. In effect, ceded taxes were
a kind of transfer, by which some of
the central government’s taxes were
collected and administered by the
Communities. 
The 1996 reform contained a number
of important provisions. First, the
Personal Income Tax became a ceded
tax – albeit only partially. Second, the
central government gave to
Communities the power to regulate
some aspects of these taxes. The
Communities gained control over such
matters as tax brackets, tax rates and
some tax credits. 
Centre still has ultimate authority
The means of transferring this authority
was what the Spanish call “a
delegation of legislative powers” from
the central government to the
Communities. Unlike the constitutions
and established practices of most other
federations, the Spanish Constitution
permits this sort of “delegation.” But
because the central government only
delegates powers that are still in
principle its own, it can both control
how the Communities exercise those
powers and, perhaps more important,
revoke them at any time it chooses. 
It is generally agreed, however, that if
the central government were to actually
try to exercise its power of revocation it
would create great stress on the
relations between the two tiers of
government. For this reason, the new
powers of Communities regarding
ceded taxes are seen by most as being
virtually permanent. 
Following the reform, the yield from
ceded taxes still accrues to each
Community on the basis of taxes paid
by its own taxpayers. But now, should a
Community exercise its new legislative
powers, the yield will be the result of
the Community’s own taxing autonomy.
What until 1997 had been a form of
transfer became a form of tax sharing. 
The 2001 reform expanded the
Communities’ legislative powers and
added to the list of taxes that could be
ceded to them. 
There are a great many different kinds
of ceded taxes, ranging from the
personal income tax to death and gift
taxes to gambling taxes. Depending on
the tax, the yield totally or partially
accrues to Communities, which may or
may not take on legislative powers,
and may or may not be in charge of
the tax’s administration. 
In fact, the powers that Communities
have vary so widely, depending on the
tax, that in some cases the ceded tax
still operates as a mere transfer (for
instance, in the case of the value
added tax). In other cases, the broad
scope of the powers granted makes
the ceded tax something very similar
to an autonomous tax (for example, in
the case of gambling taxes). 
From dictatorship to a gradual
federalization
When Spain developed a democratic
constitution in 1978, following the
death of Franco, it provided for the
formation of the distinctly Spanish
entities known as Autonomous
Communities. Regions could opt for a
status similar to that of constituent
units in other federations – or they
could choose not to assume that
status. What happened in practice was
that all of the regions in Spain decided
to assert their autonomy and the
whole country is now divided into
these Communities. 
The Constitution does not define Spain
as a federal state. Actually, it does not
define the form of the state at all —
* Note: Spain is divided into 17 Autonomous Communities. What is said in the discussion in this article does not apply to the Basque Country and
Navarra which, according to the Constitution, have special status (i.e. more autonomy), implying different taxation powers than apply to the rest of the
Communities. The commentary in this article also does not apply to the two Autonomous Cities (Ceuta and Melilla), since they do not have legislative
powers. The Canary Islands also have a special tax regime in some aspects (i.e. no Value Added Tax), but it does not differ greatly from the general
system, so they do have most ceded taxes.
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after Franco’s centralized government,
consensus on this matter was anything
but easy to obtain. But it is generally
agreed that, given the broad scope of
its decentralization, Spain is in practice
a federation. 
In the years immediately following
1978 the Communities were financially
dependent on transfers from the
central government. They did not levy
their own taxes to any significant
extent. 
This was not a problem, in part
because during that period many
Spaniards tended to regard the
Communities with certain distrust. In
fact, voters rejected Community efforts
to establish their own taxes — as
happened in the Community of
Madrid, in 1987. 
But, as time passed, the Communities
gradually gained more authority and
their financial needs grew. This resulted
in a gradual expansion of the transfer
system, and more financially
dependent Communities. 
Soon, debates about the Communities’
fiscal responsibility became one of the
main characteristics of the relationship
between the central and Community
governments. By the end of the
eighties, some Communities were
ready to play a more active role in
taxation policy. In fact, they established
new taxes. 
The central government did not always
accept such taxes and was unwilling to
give up its de facto taxation
sovereignty. It challenged some of
these new taxes in Spain’s
Constitutional Court. The war on the
sharing of taxes had been declared and
it became obvious that there was a
need to reassign taxation powers. The
fiscal reforms of 1996 and 2001 were a
way to buy peace between the centre
and the regions and to get the
Communities to take greater
responsibility both for spending and for
collecting revenue. Many doubt
whether that purpose has yet been
achieved.
The reforms have not yet delivered
the hoped-for results
Autonomous Communities are given
the option to choose whether they
want to exercise their regulatory
powers. This is coherent with the so-
called “optional autonomy system” in
the Spanish Constitution, by which
each Community may decide what
powers and authorities it wants to take
on. 
But the way that this option has been
structured – and the fact that the
central government still guarantees
Communities lump-sum grants
allocated on the basis of what they
have historically received – serves to
create a strong disincentive for
Communities to use their new taxation
powers.
Proof of this disincentive is the fact
that, since 1997, Communities have
mainly used their powers to create new
fiscal benefits – assuring that they will
be seen by taxpayers as the “Fairy
Godmothers” who offer services to
citizens without asking for money in
exchange, while the taxing role of the
“Wicked Stepmother” is played by the
central government.
So although there has been a
reassignment of taxation powers, and
Communities now have more room
than they ever had for designing their
own taxation policies, they still prefer
to rely mainly on transfers from the
central government. 
In the year 2000, conditional and
unconditional transfers still represented
roughly 60% of the Communities’ total
revenues while the yield derived from
ceded taxes represented 25%.
However, if we take into account that
most ceded taxes act as “transfers”
(where the Communities do not
exercise any regulatory powers on the
tax rates), transfers from the central
government still represented, in the
year 2000, the overwhelming bulk of
the Communities’ total revenues. Given
that the Communities spend about
40% of total expenditure – while
collecting only about 15% of the
revenue — many observers argue that
there is something askew in the fiscal
system of Spain.
If one of the reasons for the reform
was to increase the Communities’ fiscal
responsibility and make them more
accountable to taxpayers for the money
they spend, it has failed to attain its
goal. It remains to be seen whether the
latest increase of Community taxation
powers will help to change this
situation. 
Most knowledgeable observers think
that it will not, since the incentive
problems just described remain largely
the same in the laws putting the new
agreements into practice.
The distribution of taxation powers in the 
Spanish Constitution
The constitution gives Autonomous Communities taxation powers (sections
133 and 157) but the central state can limit them through a special law
(section 157.3). The central government made use of this power as early as
1980 by approving the Autonomous Regions Finance Act. This law imposes
severe limits on the creation of new taxes by the Communities. The most
important is the prohibition of double taxation, which prevents autonomous
taxes from being similar to central state and municipal taxes. Since these two
bodies had already established taxes on most of the imaginable sources of
revenue, little tax room was left for Communities. Moreover, the
Constitutional Court has interpreted these limits broadly, making it almost
impossible for Communities to invent new taxes. 
Therefore, despite constitutional provisions that guarantee Communities both
the power to establish taxes and financial autonomy (section 156.1), the
limits established by the central state have led to a system where taxation
powers remain mostly in its own hands.
